

# REPORTING AND CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONAL H<sub>2</sub>S ALARM INCIDENTS

Prioritizing Personal H<sub>2</sub>S Alarm Incidents Using a Standard Risk Assessment Process

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# **AGENDA**

Why Report and Risk Rank Personal H<sub>2</sub>S Alarms? Reporting and Risk Ranking Process Data Analysis Unexpected Discoveries and Benefits Recommendations for Implementation

## WHY REPORT PERSONAL H<sub>2</sub>S ALARMS?

Additional data to identify H<sub>2</sub>S Hazards

Required use of monitors = entire population of all possible exposures is measured - Capture This Data

See a larger percentage of H<sub>2</sub>S related incidents

- If no required reporting, do not see near misses only see incidents with consequences
- 93.5% of  $H_2S$  alarms were near misses/potential incidents
- Identifies potentially more high risk incidents

# WHY RISK RANK PERSONAL H<sub>2</sub>S ALARM INCIDENTS?

Prioritization

- Focus management's attention on hazard sources
- Focus resources based on risk
- Triggers fact gathering
- Determines level of incident investigation

## **REPORTING AND RISK RANKING PROCESS**

 Uses existing incident reporting, risk ranking and investigation processes



#### **REPORT**

Policy requires all personal H<sub>2</sub>S and CO alarms be reported
 First Report of Incident entered by a supervisor

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	First Report of Incident	
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Immediate Corrective Actions Taken:		
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Near Miss (Incident without Consequences)		

### **FACT GATHERING**

- First Report only includes the basic elements
- Additional information required for risk ranking:
  - Chemical involved
  - Source of chemical involved
  - Volume of chemical involved
  - Concentration of H<sub>2</sub>S in the chemical involved
  - Concentration of H<sub>2</sub>S measured by personal monitor
  - Full-shift and short term exposures, if available
  - Task performed at time of the alarm
- Conducted by site IH or H&S Professional

#### **RISK RANKING PROCESS**

- Focused specifically to Personal H<sub>2</sub>S alarms
- Standardized for U.S. Manufacturing Sites
- Step-by step method to classify H<sub>2</sub>S alarms: low, medium or high
- Considers:
  - Actual health effects
  - Respiratory protection
  - Volume of chemical involved
  - Concentration of H<sub>2</sub>S in chemical
  - Risk ranking using the Shell Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)
- Conducted by site IH, incident management coordinator or lead investigator

#### Entering and Classifying H2S Alarm Incidents in FIM



# DATA ANALYSIS – ALL PERSONAL ALARM INCIDENTS



114 personal alarm incidents 12/27/2009 - 04/25/2011

# **RISK RANKING RESULTS**



# **CAUSES OF H<sub>2</sub>S ALARM INCIDENTS**

77 personal H<sub>2</sub>S alarm incidents 12/27/2009 - 04/25/2011

- Leading causes:
  - **Leaks 29%**
  - Line breaks / Opening equipment – 23%
  - Lab analysis 12%
  - Draining equipment 13%
  - Process sampling 13%



# **CAUSES OF H<sub>2</sub>S ALARM INCIDENTS OVER TIME**

77 personal H<sub>2</sub>S alarm incidents 12/27/2009 – 04/25/2011



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#### **UNEXPECTED DISCOVERIES AND BENEFITS**

- Reporting all types of personal alarms H<sub>2</sub>S, CO, LEL
- Alarms triggered by chemicals other than that intended
  - H<sub>2</sub>S alarms: 7% H<sub>2</sub>
  - CO alarms: 65% H<sub>2</sub>, 3% hydrocarbon
- Improved environmental responsibility
  - Incidents are reviewed and risk ranked by environmental engineers
  - Detect and repair leaks not found by LDAR program
- Improved safety and reliability
  - Incidents are reviewed and risk ranked by reliability engineers
  - Detect and repair H<sub>2</sub> and hydrocarbon leaks

# **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

- Require reporting of personal alarms don't just recommend
- Provide written guidance and training on:
  - Information required for initial report
  - Entry of initial report
  - Documenting closing the incident loop: alarm, report, control, verify
- Minimize number of individuals conducting risk ranking
- Configure incident database for accurate data retrieval
  Add incident flag for "Personal gas monitor alarm"
- Communicate benefits of reporting to site personnel repeatedly
- Use interim controls other than SARs where possible
- Standardize personal gas monitors





### BACKGROUND

MOTIVA Enterprises, L.L.C. – Convent Refinery:

- SE Louisiana
- 50/50 JV Shell Group and Saudi Refining Inc.
- Constructed: 1964
- Throughput: 245,000 bpd
- Crude slate: predominately sour crude
- Products: Fuel oil and lighter



#### **HISTORY OF PROCESS**

Path to standardized reporting and risk ranking:

- 1998, Feb. H<sub>2</sub>S related fatality
- 1998 Required personal H<sub>2</sub>S monitors for company personnel
- 2007, Aug. Required personal H<sub>2</sub>S monitors for anyone entering the refinery
- 2009, Dec. Required personal CO monitors in some areas
- 2009, Dec. Required reporting of personal H<sub>2</sub>S and CO alarms
- 2010, Mar. H<sub>2</sub>S Team, Goal: Zero personal H<sub>2</sub>S Alarm Incidents
- 2010, Apr. H<sub>2</sub>S Alarm Incident Risk Ranking Pilot

## **CONTROLS - LEAKS**

- Most leaks were unknown prior to personal alarm incident
- LDAR program, PEI program and operator rounds play a large role in control
- Added:
  - Personal alarm reporting process itself repair identified leaks

# **CONTROLS – LINE BREAKS / OPENING EQUIPMENT**

- Equipment draining and decontamination procedures, permit to work process and energy isolation play a large role in control
- Zero Energy Isolation reduced splash/spray incidents

Added:

- Decontamination of Process Equipment Chemical Exposure Control Policy
- Line Break Policy
- Full-time respirator technician





# **CONTROLS – LAB ANALYSIS**

 Lab ventilation systems, analytical procedures, lab design, sample cooling and limiting chemical volume play a large role in control

Added:

- Move problem analysis into lab hoods
- Vent instruments to ventilation systems
- High flowrate fans for outside operations
- Increase emphasis on process sample labeling





# **CONTROLS – DRAINING EQUIPMENT**

- Equipment draining and decontamination procedures, closed drain lines and hoses, closed decontamination headers (T/A) and decontamination stream analysis (T/A) play a large role in control
- Added:
  - Additional closed drain lines
  - Improve drain/vent to flare

# **CONTROLS – PROCESS SAMPLING**

 Closed-loop sample stations, eductor box sample stations and process sampling procedures play a large role in control

Added:

- Hierarchy of controls specific to process sampling
- Discontinue/minimize sampling
- Additional closed-loop sample stations
- Microwave gauges on tanks
- Mini SAR carts





## **NEXT STEPS**

- Automatic download of personal monitor data see all alarms
- Increase emphasis on reporting requirements
  - Communicate data analysis and benefits to site personnel
  - Communicate unreported alarms to management
- Configure hand-held instruments with H<sub>2</sub> null CO sensors and H<sub>2</sub> sensors to investigate H<sub>2</sub> and CO sources
- Adjust H<sub>2</sub>S alarm set points: 5 ppm low, 10 ppm high
- Required reporting and classification of personal H<sub>2</sub>S alarms at Shell Group U.S. Manufacturing sites